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Social and/or national revolution? Ukrainian communisms in the revolution 
and civil war 
Ukraine in the revolutionary period of 1917–1920 found itself in an ideological and political 
cauldron. Revolutionary parties and movements developed and attempted to implement various 
often contradictory and mutually exclusive projects of state-building and social transformation. 
These diverse visions often developed under the ideological umbrella of ‘socialism’ - since the 
revolutionary events of 1905-1907 most activist political currents in Ukraine had professed a 
socialist orientation. However, the socialist movement in Ukraine became significantly 
diversified after the February Revolution of 1917, a time when national aspirations and political 
separatist currents were gaining strength at the margins of the Russian Empire. In the new 
conditions of political freedom in Ukraine, parallel projects developed and canvassed, 
articulating different conceptions of Ukraine’s sovereignty and political autonomy, in which two 
different political horizons can be distinguished. In the all-Russia parties and movements 
operating in Ukraine, pan-imperial attitudes and horizons remained dominant even after the 
downfall of the Romanovs. The most important of these parties – the Russian Social Democratic 
Workers’ Party (RSDRP, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) and the Party of Socialist-
Revolutionaries – all supported the idea of unchanged political borders and, as before, a 
centralist government. But there was another entire spectrum of nationally-oriented socialist 
organisations, consisting of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (USDRP) and the 
Ukrainian SRs in 1917, and later the Ukrainian communist parties of the Borot'bysty and the 
Nezalezhnyky, which adopted a separatist orientation and stressed the need for Ukraine’s 
autonomy in political, economic and cultural matters. In 1917, it was these parties, with their 
national Ukrainian horizons and concerns, which gained the greatest support among the 
population, as the massive votes for these parties in Ukraine in the elections to the all-Russia 
Constituent Assembly in November 1917 demonstrated. 
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Nonetheless, these nationally-oriented parties and their intelligentsia leaderships were 
unable to maintain power in the chaos of the post-revolutionary years. Ultimately, it was an all-
Russia political power, the Bolsheviks and the Red Army, which proved to be the only force 
able to take control over most of Ukraine. However, as the Red forces’ rapidly changing political 
fortunes in Ukraine during the civil war showed, military supremacy alone was not enough to 
take and exercise power in Ukraine. The Bolshevik leaders had to take on significant parts of the 
national aspirations which had been expressed in 1917-1918, and co-opt and absorb many of the 
diverse Ukraine-oriented left forces which had been articulating these aspirations. By embracing 
the popular nationalist discourse and making the national question an intrinsic part of their 
programme, the Bolsheviks were able to use the national factor to mobilise the population for 
reconstructing the country and help strengthen their position in the borderlands after the civil 
war was over. A policy known as korenizatsiia, or indigenisation, was introduced Union-wide in 
1923. It was intended to head off local nationalism by recruiting natives to staff and lead local 
Soviet bodies, but in Ukraine the policy rapidly led to the emergence of new Soviet Ukrainian 
elites, who by the late 1920s had started challenging the central party leadership in Moscow. 
With the launch of the industrialisation campaign at the end of the 1920s, which required 
centralisation of political control Ukrainian ‘national communism’ became a political threat that 
Moscow could no longer tolerate. 
 
Ukraine after February 
The February Revolution initiated a complicated process of transforming the autocratic Russian 
Empire. Once Nicholas II abdicated, a Provisional Government was formed in Petrograd, which 
began to replace imperial bureaucrats with their own administrations throughout the empire. 
The Provisional Government was intended as a caretaker administration until elections could he 
held for an all-Russia Constituent Assembly, which would decide the future of the empire. In its 
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early declarations, the Provisional Government condemned the restrictive tsarist regime, 
promised the equality to all citizens, and provided for cultural national autonomy. Despite those 
initiatives, it never enjoyed firm public support and rapidly lost authority due to its inability to 
tackle the problems of the Russian empire in conditions of wartime chaos, economic collapse 
and general social unrest. 
At the same time, councils (soviets) of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies were 
spontaneously formed in the industrial centres and the garrisons of revolutionary soldiers at 
frontline. In Ukraine the first soviet was elected in Kharkiv on 2 March 1917, and a day later in 
Kyiv. By mid-1917, there were already 252 soviets on Ukraine’s territory. Most of them were 
situated in the east of Ukraine (180 soviets or 71 per cent in the industrial Donbas area); big 
cities, such as Kharkiv, Kyiv, Katerynoslav, and Poltava, and in the frontline areas.1 The  
soviets on Ukraine’s territory were generally dominated by the all-Russia socialist parties – 
initially SRs and the Mensheviks, but as 1917 wore on they increasingly became Bolshevik 
strongholds in Ukraine. 
Both the Provisional Government and the soviets of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies 
represented the all-Russia, pan-imperial political horizon in Ukraine. Neither of them could 
offer any feasible response to the separatist movements that started gaining strength after 
February 1917. Ukraine’s nationally-conscious intelligentsia interpreted  the revolutionary 
upheavals as the precursors for a national, Ukrainian, revolution, leading eventually to a full 
social and national emancipation of the country. But first of all, Ukraine itself needed to 
become a reality. ‘Ukraine’, as such, had not existed in the Tsarist empire; its territory consisted 
of three provinces (gubernii) populated predominantly by ethnic Ukrainians, but with no special 
political status within the empire. The fall of the monarchy created the opportunity for recently 




Representatives of pro-Ukraine political parties and nationalist activists gathered in Kyiv 
on 4 March 1917, where a future national legislative authority, the Tsentral’na Rada [Central 
Council] was founded. Its formation was initiated by the Society of Ukrainian Progressives 
[Tovarystvo Ukraiins’kykh Postupovtsiv, TUP], a nonpartisan political and civic organisation 
formed in 1908, and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers’ Party, a successor of the 
Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the first mass party in Ukraine, established in 1899 in Kharkiv. 
The Rada consisted predominantly of left-wing political groups; beside the USDRP, most 
members belonged to the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) and the 
Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists (UPSF). They represented all the social groups on 
Ukraine’s territory, for whom Kyiv was the main point of political reference and Ukraine was 
the main scope of their political objectives. The leaders of the Tsentral’na Rada included 
intellectuals, academics, writers, and public activists, many of whom had hurried back from 
Petrograd, inspired by the outbreak of the Ukrainian Revolution. Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, an 
historian and a public activist, one of the founders of the Ukrainian National-Democratic Party 
in Eastern Galicia and the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, was elected a president of the 
Tsentral’na Rada. Alongside the Provisional Government and the network of soviets, the Rada 
became the third competing authority on Ukrainian territory. 
This nationally-oriented intelligentsia believed that Ukraine was oppressed both 
nationally and socially. Accordingly, the Rada tried to respond equally to the nationalist 
aspirations of the intelligentsia and the need for social and economic reforms. We should note 
that at this early stage, the Ukrainian intelligentsia did not even consider the possibility of 
Ukraine’s independence. Immediate separation from Russia was entirely absent from Ukrainian 
public discourse - the initial demands of the nationalist leaders in the Rada did not go beyond 
national-territorial autonomy for Ukraine within a democratically transformed Russia. In a 
letter of greeting from the Rada to the head of the Provisional Government in Petrograd Prince 
L’vov and the Minister of Justice Alexander Kerensky on 7 March 1917, the Ukrainian leaders 
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expressed their hope that in a free Russia, equal rights for the Ukrainian people would be 
guaranteed.3 A month later, during the First Ukrainian National Congress held in Kyiv on 6-8 
April 1917, it was reiterated that ‘only the national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine can 
guarantee the needs of the Ukrainian people and other people living on Ukraine’s land’.4  
It was clear, however, that Ukraine’s autonomy could not be achieved without the support 
of the army. The Ukrainisation of the military units was controlled by Symon Petliura, at that 
time  head of the Ukrainian front council in Minsk, and Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi, a founder of the 
Ukrainian independence movement. In early May 1917, the First All-Ukrainian Military 
Congress took place in Kyiv, representing those Ukrainianised military units which pledged 
support to the Central Rada. Altogether, around nine-hundred delegates, representing Ukrainian 
military units on all fronts, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, and military garrisons in Ukraine 
and Russia participated in the Congress. It passed a resolution ‘On Ukrainian Autonomy’, 
encouraging the Rada to declare the national-territorial autonomy for Ukraine immediately.5 
Armed with this support from military units, a delegation from the Rada left for Petrograd on 
13 May 1917 to present case for Ukraine’s autonomy to the Provisional Government. The 
Ukrainian demands were largely ignored in Petrograd, however.6 
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Rada leaders proceeded with their agenda. Backed by the 
decision of the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress (5 June 1917) and the First All-
Ukrainian Peasant Congress (28 May – 2 June 1917) the Rada decided to declare Ukraine’s 
autonomy unilaterally. The First Universal [a legal act-declaration] of the Central Rada, issued 
on 10 June 1917, proclaimed that ‘without seceding from all of Russia [...] let the Ukrainian 
people have the right to manage its own life on its own soil’.7 The First Universal also 
envisaged the creation of a democratically elected all-Ukrainian people’s assembly with the 




As the political crisis in Petrograd deepened in the summer of 1917,  the position of the 
Ukrainian Rada became stronger. On 28 June 1917, a delegation headed by Kerensky arrived in 
Kyiv to negotiate the status of Ukraine.8 A compromise was reached, which laid the foundation 
for the Second Universal, issued on 3 July. This Universal reiterated that Ukraine had no 
aspirations to separate from Russia, ‘in order that we and all her peoples might jointly strive 
toward the development and welfare of all Russia and toward the unity of her democratic 
forces’.9 The principle of Ukraine’s autonomy was thus recognised by both the Provisional 
Government and the Central Rada - but without any precise delineation of the territory on 
which Ukrainian autonomy was to  be applied.10 
It was events in Petrograd which precipitated the shift from autonomism to separatism in 
Ukraine’s political discourse. On 25 October the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional 
Government and took power in Petrograd. In Ukraine, the local soviets of workers’ and 
soldiers’ deputies, by now dominated by Bolsheviks quickly declared their support to the new 
authorities. On the streets of Kyiv, Bolshevik activists revolted against the forces of the 
Provisional Government. The immediate response of the Central Rada was to create a 
Committee for the Rescue of the Revolution, in which  representatives of all political forces in 
the capital, including the Bolsheviks, Russian SRs and the Bund leaders were invited to take 
part.11 The Rada at first tried to remain neutral in the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the 
defenders of the Provisional Government Kyiv. After three days of fighting, a truce was agreed, 
according to which the Rada assumed the powers of the Provisional Government in Ukraine 
and took over its military forces.12  
Exploiting this prerogative further, on 7 November the Rada adopted its Third Universal. 
‘Without separating ourselves from the Russian Republic and maintaining its unity’, the 
creation of a separate Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukraiins’ka Narodna Respublika, UNR) 
and its government – the General Secretariat, was proclaimed.13 The Universal also included a 
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number of important political and social decisions – abolishing existing private landownership, 
introducing an eight-hour working day and state control over production, and granting national 
minorities the right to national-personal autonomy. All these initiatives were to be legalised by 
a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly – not to be confused with the All-Russia Constituent 
Assembly – scheduled for 9 January 1918.14 
The elections to the All-Russia Constituent Assembly, held on 25 November, showed that 
the project for Ukraine elaborated by the nationally-oriented parties had increased its support. 
Lenin’s Council of People’s Commissars in Petrograd  had allowed the elections to the assembly 
to take place, despite the fact that they were based on universal suffrage rather than the class-
based franchise of the soviets. Among other things, they hoped the results might legitimise their 
claims to power in the former imperial borderlands. The results of the elections in Ukraine, 
however, proved the opposite. The nationalist parties gained 75 per cent of the votes. The 
Bolshevik share of the poll in Ukraine was just ten per cent.15 After another attempted but 
unsuccessful uprising in Kyiv on 29-30 November, followed by their failure to secure control of 
the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets held in Kyiv on 4-6 December, the defeated Bolsheviks 
retreated eastward to Kharkiv. Here they convened an alternative congress, at which they 
proclaimed an autonomous Ukrainian People’s Republic of Soviets and its government – the 
People’s Secretariat of Ukraine. At the same time, an ultimatum, signed by Lenin and Trotsky, 
was sent to the Rada. It demanded the legalisation of the Bolshevik military units, and threatened 
war if their demand was unmet.16   
The UNR leaders rejected the ultimatum, and armed conflict began.17 On 11 January, 
under Bolshevik fire, the Rada with its Fourth Universal finally declared independence of 
Ukraine: ‘From this day forth, the Ukrainian People’s Republic becomes independent, subject to 
no one, a Free, Sovereign State of the Ukrainian People.’18But by this time the declaration made 
little practical difference; the General Secretariat was too weak to defend its territory. On 26 
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January 1918, Bolshevik and pro-Soviet forces took Kyiv for the first time, and the UNR was 
forced to retreat westwards to Zhytomyr. 
The war between Soviet and Ukrainian national forces continued, in various guises and 
with varying success, until November 1921, when the Soviet regime was established on almost 
the entire territory of Ukraine. This eventual outcome was not only the result of Bolshevik 
military supremacy. As the ‘Russian’ civil war developed, many Ukrainians were obliged to 
orient themselves to one or other of the belligerent sides. Besides the UNR and the Bolsheviks, 
foreign governments started looking for opportunities in war-torn Ukraine. In search for allies, 
the Ukrainian nationally-oriented political elites turned to the Central Powers, inviting those 
recent enemies into Ukraine. By the end of February 1918, there were almost half a million 
German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers on the territory of Ukraine, and by the end of April they 
had occupied its entire territory and returned the Ukrainian authorities to the capital.  
In return, the Ukrainian government undertook to deliver substantial quantities of grain, 
food and raw materials to the occupying countries. The main burden fell on the peasants, who 
could not comprehend how or why the Germans had come to be in control. The UNR was 
losing the sympathy of its main social basis – the Ukrainian-speaking countryside. Numerous 
peasant leaders, otamans, took the advantage of the power vacuum on the ground to declare 
self-rule and take control over the land. Their mistrust towards the Ukrainian government, who 
had forced them under German control, was fatal for the nationalists’ cause. When the UNR 
leader Petliura, this time backed by the Polish army as part of the Russo-Polish war, returned to 
Kyiv in May 1920, the general anti-Bolshevik uprising he had hoped for failed through lack of 
support. The peasant otamans, instead, sided with the Bolsheviks, whose promised system of 
soviets and revkomy appeared more in line with the popular slogans of self-government and 




Soviet power in Ukraine 
During the post-revolutionary decade, the Bolsheviks in Ukraine evolved from being a regional 
organisation of the RSDRP(b), representing the Russian-speaking industrial workers and 
soldiers in the border provinces, to becoming the only legal political organisation in Ukraine – 
the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (KP(b)U), consisting predominantly of ethnic 
Ukrainians. This monopoly was achieved equally through military supremacy, successful 
propaganda, tactical political alliances and revisions to their political programme. 
The Bolsheviks started from a marginal position, however. In 1917, the regional 
organisations of the RSDRP(b) in Ukraine numbered some twenty-two thousand members, with 
two thirds of them being concentrated in the industrial and Russian-speaking Donbas area.20 
The course of the civil war changed matters. By mid-1918, the Bolsheviks had been ousted 
from power and driven underground in Ukraine by the German-Austrian occupying forces, the 
allies of the Ukrainian government. However, the terms of the Ukrainian-German alliance 
antagonised the countryside, which gave the Bolsheviks and other pro-Soviet forces an 
opportunity to compete for social support.  
 Regional party organisations needed resources to react more quickly to political and 
military reversals on the ground. The Russian Bolsheviks, bound by the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, could not openly wage war against Germany, whereas a nominally independent Soviet 
government on Ukraine’s territory could engage the German occupying armies in combat 
without breaching the treaty,21 and secure grassroots support by co-opting other leftist parties in 
Ukraine in the struggle against the common enemy. Consequently, on 7 March 1918 at the All-
Ukrainian Congress of Soviets the creation of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was 
proclaimed.22  
A separate soviet republic required a separate leadership. On 18-20 April 1918, 
communists from Ukraine met in Taganrog to discuss a possibility of a separate communist 
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party for Ukraine. At Taganrog, the Bolsheviks, whose party had by now been renamed the 
Russian Communist Party (RKP(b)) were joined by radicals from the Ukrainian SRs and the 
USDRP, who had retreated east together with the Red Army. This was not a sign of an 
ideological unanimity between the left parties, however. The primary goal of the left parties at 
this stage was to fight ‘the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie’,23 the 
Ukrainian-German forces in Ukraine. There was little agreement beyond that. The main 
concerns of the Taganrog meeting were the status of the communist party in Ukraine – was it a 
separate organisation or a branch of the Russian Bolshevik party? - and its social support – 
should the peasants, who constituted the majority of Ukraine’s population, be seen as a 
revolutionary class?  
Already at Taganrog, two different ideological camps within the Bolsheviks in Ukraine 
took shape. The so called Katerynoslav group, headed by Fedor Sergeev (Artem) and Emanuil 
Kviring. represented the industrial south-eastern provinces. ThIS group rejected the idea of a 
separate party outright, arguing that Ukraine’s revolutionary forces, weakened by the civil war 
and the German occupation, would not be able to restore soviet power without the help of the 
Russian Bolsheviks. Hence, Ukraine’s Bolshevik organisation should remain the part of the all-
Russia Bolshevik party. In contrast,  the Kyiv group headed by Georgii Piatakov promoted an 
idea of an autonomous Ukrainian Bolshevik party, which would become the vanguard of the 
oppressed people in Ukraine, especially the revolutionary peasantry. A similar position was 
articulated by Mykola Skrypnyk, an old communist and Lenin’s close ally, who was sent to 
Ukraine to mediate between the two groups. Skrypnyk, who headed the Soviet government in 
Ukraine between December 1917 and April 1918, sided with those supporting a separate 
communist party. Unlike Piatakov, who envisaged that the central committee of a Ukrainian 
Bolshevik party would act under the central committee of the Russian communist party, 
Skrypnyk advocated a Ukrainian party with its own independent central committee, which 
would cooperate with the RKP(b) only through an international organisation, the envisaged 
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Third International.24 Of these three proposals, Skrypnyk’s one gained the majority of votes at 
Taganrog.25 
Nonetheless, this separate status of Ukraine and its party was significantly undermined by 
the fact that the organisational bureau of the KP(b)U was situated in Moscow. The resolution of 
the Taganrog Conference was cancelled by the KP(b)U First Congress, held in Moscow on 5-12 
July 1918. This congress resolved that the KP(b)U would be an integral, although autonomous, 
part of the RKP(b). The central committee of the KP(b)U acknowledged the authority of the 
central committee of the RKP(b). The party lost its status, but retained its name.26 To make 
things unambiguous, the RKP(b) programme, adopted by the Eighth Party Congress in Moscow 
on 18-23 March 1919, stated that despite the separate status of the Soviet republics there was no 
intention to reorganise the Party as a federation of independent Communist parties: “There must 
exist a single centralised Communist Party with a single Central Committee leading all the 
Party work in all sections of the RSFSR. All decisions of the RKP(b) and its directing organs 
are un-conditionally binding on all branches of the party, regardless of their national 
composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Communists 
enjoy the rights of the regional committees of the party, and are entirely subordinated to the 
Central Committee of the RKP(b).”27 
Ukraine’s subordinate position was also reflected in the status of its government. The first 
soviet government in Ukraine, the People’s Secretariat, was formed in Kharkiv on 17 December 
1917. It consisted mostly of RSDRP(b) members, as no specifically Ukrainian Bolshevik 
organisation had yet been established. This government, headed by Skrypnyk included a number 
of Ukraine-minded Bolsheviks, however, such as Vasyl’ Shakhrai, Iurii Kotsiubyns’kyi, and 
Georgii Lapchyns’kyi, who would later champion the inner-party opposition to party 
centralisation. The second soviet government, the Provisional Workers-Peasants Government of 
Ukraine, was formed during the Second All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets in Kursk on 28 
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November 1918. It was later renamed the Council of People’s Commissars (Radnarkom). 
Khrystian Rakovskyi headed the government until July 1923.  
The authorities of the Soviet government in Ukraine were significantly limited. Already in 
June 1919, a decree ‘On the Unification of the Soviet republics of Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Belarus for the Struggle against War Imperialism’ deprived the enumerated 
republics of their own Commissariats of War, National Economy, Railroads, Finance and 
Labour.28 The need to unify the above-mentioned commissariats with their Russian counterparts 
‘for defence purposes as well as in the interests of economic development’ was further reiterated 
in a separate agreement between Russia and Ukraine, signed on 28 December 1920. In return for 
Russia’s control over most important commissariats, Soviet Ukraine was recognised as an 
independent and sovereign state.29 
 
Ukrainian Communist Parties 
In 1923, the first historian of the KP(b)U Moisei Ravich-Cherkasskii suggested that the history 
of the KP(b)U was “a sum of two histories: that of the Ukrainian proletariat and that of the 
Russian proletariat in Ukraine”.30 Accordingly, there were two distinct ideological roots in the 
KP(b)U, one extending from the Russian revolutionary movement and another from the 
Ukrainian socialist movement. The differences between these two ideological camps conditioned 
a certain level of plurality within the KP(b)U during the 1920s. Among the most frequent 
concerns were the status of Soviet Ukraine, its government and its Bolshevik party. 
Perhaps the earliest attempt to voice national concerns inside the party belonged to the 
Ukrainian Bolshevik Shakhrai, Commissar for Military Affairs in Skrypnyk’s government 
before January 1918. In his pamphlet Revoliutsiia na Ukraine [The Revolution in Ukraine], 
Shakhrai summarised the experience of Soviet state-building in Ukraine, highlighting the 
importance of the national component in the socialist revolution.31 In January 1919, Shakhrai in 
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co-authorship with another KP(b)U member Serhii Mazlakh published a pamphlet Do Khvyli: 
Shcho Diiet'sia na Ukraїni i z Ukraїnoiu? [Concerning the Moment: What is Happening in and 
to Ukraine].32 This work highlighted the contradiction between Lenin’s claims for nations’ right 
to self-determination (realised, the authors believed, in the creation of Soviet Ukraine) and the 
subordinate position of the republic’s Bolshevik party. 
In Do Khvyli, Shakhrai and Mazlakh scrutinised the Russian position towards Ukraine. 
They supported the idea of an independent Soviet Ukraine with its own separate communist 
party, standing on an equal footing with the RKP(b). At the party meeting at Taganrog Shakhrai 
even suggested calling it the ‘Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks – UKP(b)’, modelled 
on the RKP(b), rather than KP(b)U (Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine). The idea was, 
however, rejected at the Congress in order to avoid ambiguity: “Ukrainian” could both mean ‘of 
Ukraine’ and ‘of Ukrainians’; and the latter could hardly be used to characterise the Bolshevik 
party at the time.33 
For Shakhrai and Mazlakh, Ukraine’s socialist orientation was beyond question. The 
question of who would be in the vanguard of this socialist construction remained, however, 
open. In Do Khvyli, a list of demands was put forward which  challenged Russian dominance in 
Ukraine. This list, which can be seen as the foundation for Ukrainian national communism 
included: 
- Ukraine and the Ukrainian people had defined themselves as a 
nation and proclaimed their independence; 
- Ukraine will fight for its independence till the end. Sooner or 
later, whether in a hard and bloody way though armed struggle, or in a 
democratic way through compromise with neighbouring countries, Ukraine 
will be independent and sovereign; 
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- Ukrainian reunion with Russia is progressive only for Russian 
great power. In contrast, Ukraine’s sovereignty is widely beneficial. The 
fewer national struggles we have, the better it is for the economic, political, 
social and cultural life of Ukraine; the bigger contribution it will be for the 
world revolution; 
- Unless the independence of Ukraine is assured, unless the 
Ukrainian worker is not nationally discriminated against, to be “nationalist” 
and “chauvinist” for Ukrainians is not only a historical right, but an 
obligation. Our “chauvinism” depends on your [Russian] “internationalism”, 
but you hide behind the words and we don’t want to hide any more.34 
These statements by Shakhrai and Mazlakh gained support from other Ukraine-minded 
Bolsheviks. In summer 1919, an organising committee of the federalist group in the KP(b)U was 
formed. The faction’s leader Lapchyns’kyi was a former member of the Skrypnyk government, 
where at different times he headed the Commissariats for Office Affairs, Social Security and 
Justice. Lapchyn’skyi gradually developed a critical stand towards the Russian Bolsheviks, 
condemning the RKP(b)’s centralisation drive towards Ukraine.35 He continuously criticised 
Russian and centrally-minded Bolsheviks for their chauvinistic attempts to maintain Moscow’s 
domination over Ukraine. He believed that since the two republics had different economic and 
social bases, and therefore different objectives and concerns, the communist party could not be 
the same in both Ukraine and Russia. He campaigned for a separate communist party in Ukraine, 
which, as he explained at the Fourth KP(b)U conference, should stand on an equal footing with 
the Russian communist party and become eventually a self-standing member of the Communist 
International.36 
While these Ukrainian Bolsheviks opposed Russia’s domination of Ukrainian affairs and 
demanded equality in representation and decision-making, the members of other non-Bolshevik 
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left-wing parties in Ukraine rejected the Bolsheviks’ right to represent the Ukrainian toiling 
masses outright. The left-wing section of nationally-conscious intelligentsia also regarded 
Ukraine as an oppressed nation, and the Ukrainian workers, and especially peasants, as doubly-
oppressed: both as the toiling masses and as Ukrainians. To liberate Ukraine’s toiling masses, a 
revolution which was simultaneously social and national was needed. For these parties, 
communism and nationalism were compatible. Each nation needed to find its own way to 
communism and to adapt the universal doctrine where  necessary.  
Ukraine’s national communist camp during the civil war was represented by the 
Borot’bysty (former left-wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries); the 
Nezalezhnyky (left-wing of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Working Party); the Bor’bisty 
(Ukrainian Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries), and the Ukapisty (Ukrainian Communist 
Party, UKP).37  These parties all supported the idea of ‘soviet power’ – that is, that Ukraine 
should be a republic of soviets, in which power was exercised by these workers’ and peasants’ 
councils. They did not equate this with rule by a single hierarchical party where all the important 
decisions were taken in Moscow. These  Ukrainian communist parties all underwent major 
transformations during the civil war. Most of them originated from the Ukrainian SR 
movements, hence their attention to the Ukrainian countryside. They had been represented in the 
Central Rada and the Ukrainian government. But after the failure of the UNR and the German 
occupation they started gradually evolving towards accepting the soviet regime. Overall, the 
national communists supported the October Revolution, which they regarded as a necessary 
constituent of the world proletarian revolution. They rejected the idea of a messianic role of the 
Russian working class, however, whose example could not be copied blindly. As a Borot’byst 
paper put it in August 1919, the revolution needed to be translated ‘into the language of local 
conditions’,38 taking into account the peculiarities of Ukraine’s social situation. The socialist 
revolution in Ukraine had different social bases – semi-proletariat and poor peasantry that 
needed to be co-opted into the revolutionary struggle. 
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The national question was a cornerstone of national communism. As the Borot’bysty 
argued in February 1919, ‘the best solution to the national question would be to reach 
socialism; thus, the primary goal of each and every revolutionary socialist party [in Ukraine], 
despite their national affiliation, should be strengthening the achievements of the socialist 
revolution, which will eventually result in national emancipation.’39 Although social 
emancipation preceded a national one, Ukraine’s independence was the primary goal of 
national communists. The Nezalezhnyky, for example, argued that national self-determination 
could be easily justified in class terms: ‘only in a sovereign national state, the struggle with the 
bourgeoisie could not be overshadowed; under any other circumstances, this struggle 
automatically becomes the national struggle.’40  
A Bolshevik-led Soviet Ukraine did not represent an attarctive alternative due to its pan-
imperial horizon. The Nezalezhnyk social-democrat Myhailo Tkachenko charged that it united 
‘all sorts of Russian nationalist elements from the Black Hundreds to the revolutionary 
intelligentsia in Ukraine […] joining forces with the Bolsheviks to help reconstruct a “united 
and indivisible Russia”.’41 The Bolsheviks in Ukraine, who continued to disregard the national 
dimension of the revolution in, were dismissed by the national communists as subordinates of 
the RKP(b) and promoters of the imperialist Russian ideology.42 A Nezalezhnyk resolution 
charged that the Bolsheviks were ‘a hypocritical party which continually violates its own 
principles’,43 while the Borot’bysty  claimed that Bolshevik chauvinism was detrimental for the 
entire communist endeavour in Ukraine.44  
Despite these polemics, the Ukrainian national communists, aware of the danger of 
division among the communist forces during the civil war, sought for cooperation with the 
Bolsheviks. They continuously repeated their desire to take part in soviet institutions and share 
the responsibility for governing Ukraine. The Bolsheviks, however, were wary of their fellow 
revolutionaries. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks during the civil war were seeking political 
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allies, all the more so since the Ukrainian communists could offer a link with the resentful 
Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks did not trust these 
parties. As the Bolshevik Larik (Ievgen Kasianenko) noted, Ukrainian national communism 
was ‘the worst enemy of the communist revolution in Ukraine.’45 The KP(b)U Third Congress 
(1-6 March 1919) confirmed its stand against cooperation with the other, nationally-oriented, 
pro-soviet parties, and refused to allow their representatives into the soviet government in 
Ukraine.46 Similarly, Lenin denounced the Borot’bysty in February 1920 as ‘a party that aims to 
split the military forces and supports banditism; it is violating the basic principles of 
communism and thereby plays directly into the hands of the Whites and of international 
imperialism.’47 As we shall see, the Bolsheviks by 1920 were pursuing a twin-track policy 
towards the smaller soviet parties, including the Ukrainian national communists. On the one 
hand, some of these parties’ activists were being encouraged to go over to the Bolsheviks, 
singly or in groups, while the organisations themselves were being driven out of existence. 
Whilst encouraging this process of absorption, Bolshevik leaders in Ukraine were instructed to 
collect information on ‘the non-proletarian and most disloyal nature’ of Borot’bysty activity.48  
 
Soviet Ukraine: sovietising the national communist project 
In order to attract the ‘best’ elements of the Ukrainian revolutionary intelligentsia – and their 
social constituencies – to the Bolshevik project, the Bolsheviks needed to offer a plausible 
alternative to  the ‘bourgeois nationalism’ of the Ukrainian governments and national 
communists. Firstly, they had to be seen to avoid ‘chauvinistic’ behaviour in Ukraine. The 
language question was among the most urgent to tackle, since in their first attempts at ruling 
Ukraine the Bolsheviks had pursued Russification tactics reminiscent of the former tsarist 
government. The adverse consequences of ‘forced Russification’ of the republic were 
highlighted in the draft constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, adopted by the Third All-Ukrainian 
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Congress of Soviets in March 1919.49 Further on, to encourage a free development of local 
commonly spoken languages, the official state language [Russian] was abolished. The 
preference, nonetheless, was clearly given to Ukrainian.50  
A turn in the national policy in Ukraine was marked by the RKP(b) central committee 
resolution of late 1919 ‘On Soviet Rule in Ukraine.’ This resolution, adopted after the victory 
over Denikin’s White forces, proclaimed that the RKP(b) was committed to ‘removing all 
barriers to the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture.’ The Bolsheviks in 
Ukraine were instructed to treat the existing nationalist tendencies ‘with utmost patience and 
tact, countering them with a word of comradely explanation of the identity of interests of the 
toiling masses of Ukraine and Russia.’ Ukrainian was declared ‘a weapon of communist 
education of the toiling people’ and a tool in establishing ‘the closest contact between Soviet 
institutions and the native peasant population of the country.’51  
Next, the Bolsheviks needed to disarm their ideological rivals, the  Ukrainian communist 
parties. This was a process which developed over time. Firstly, the Bolsheviks had to show their 
interest in the Ukrainian affairs, to embrace the Ukrainian language and the latter separatist 
discourse. In his letter of 28 December 1919 ‘To the toiling masses of Ukraine after the defeat of 
Denikin’, Lenin assured his readers that it was ‘self-evident and generally recognised that only 
the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can and will decide at their All-Ukraine 
Congress of Soviets whether Ukraine shall amalgamate with Russia, or whether she shall remain 
a separate and independent republic, and, in the latter case, what federal ties shall be established 
between that republic and Russia.’52 
Subsequently, the national communists were finally invited to join the government of 
Rakovs’kyi, where they were given posts in education, justice and communication. In addition, a 
merger of the national communist parties was initiated. For instance, following their self-
liquidation in March 1920, around 4,000 former Borot'bysty members were admitted to the 
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KP(b)U on an individual basis.53 The unification of the leading communist parties in the short 
run had proven to be mutually beneficial. The Bolsheviks had eliminated an important political 
rival,  engaged those national communists in the Soviet bureaucracy and governmental 
institutions, and had been able to exploit their organisational structures and networks for 
Bolshevik party work.54 In their turn, the Ukrainian communists gained a possibility to further 
promote Ukraine’s autonomy and cultural development from within the ranks of the ruling party. 
The influence of the former Borot’bysty was especially significant in the cultural sphere, 
which the Bolsheviks had neglected in the frenzy of the civil war. Following the merger, the 
former Borot’bysty Vasyl’ Ellan-Blakytnyi and Oleksander Shums’kyi entered the KP(b)U 
Central Committee, and the former also acquired a seat in the Politburo. Arkadii Liubchenko 
became the Central Committee Secretary for Culture and the editor-in-chief of the party 
newspaper Kommunist. Already in May 1919, the Borot’bysty had taken control of Ukraine’s 
Commissariat for Education (Narkomos) and the All-Ukrainian Literary Committee, 
Vseukrlitkom. In May 1919, the Commissariat was handed over to the Borot’bysty leader, the 
poet Hnat Mykhailychenko, who was succeeded by Mykhailo Panchenko, Shums’kyi and 
Hryhorii Hryn’ko. Under the auspices of the Narkomos, a State Publishing House of Ukraine 
(Vsevydav) was opened in Kyiv. At the same time, the Borot’bysty launched the first Soviet-
sponsored Ukrainian-language literary journal Mystetstvo [Art]. In this way, former Borot’bysty 
had gradually taken control of much of the cultural and intellectual life in the republic, providing 
for the unprecedented cultural flowering of the 1920s. 
In short, to win the civil war and re-unite the former imperial territories, the Bolsheviks 
were forced to make concessions to nationalist sentiments and form alliances with local political 
forces. In doing so they co-opted, absorbed and were themselves changed by diverse Ukraine-
oriented left groups. However, this change of attitude in Ukraine also reflected a more general 
moderation of the nationalities policy within the Soviet Union. As the civil war had proven, the 
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national question in the peripheries could not be ignored. In Ukraine, this acquired even greater 
importance since the newly acquired western Soviet borderlands fell under the strategic plans of 
new Poland’s head of state Józef Piłsudski. The possibility of losing Ukraine became especially 
apparent after the united UNR-Polish Army had driven the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine’s capital 
in May 1920. As the Polish-Soviet war raged, Stalin, Russia’s Commissar for Nationalities at the 
time, highlighted the urgent need to reassess the position of the Soviet government on the 
national question. In October 1920, he observed that the very success of the Russian Revolution 
depended heavily on redefining the centre-periphery relationship: ‘Central Russia, that hearth of 
world revolution, cannot hold out long without the assistance of the border regions, which 
abound in raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs. The border regions of Russia in their turn would be 
inevitably doomed to imperialist bondage without the political, military and organisational 
support of more developed central Russia.’55 
This new approach to the national question was approved at the 1921 party congress. The 
political, social and economic modernisation of the former imperial lands was seen as the 
remedy for the alienation of the peripheries, their mistrust of the centre, as well as their search 
for foreign alliances. A comprehensive national program was envisaged, which included 
establishing local administration, promoting national languages and cultures, and recruiting 
indigenous intellectual forces into the party. 
The success of the task, however, relied on the active participation of the indigenous 
population in creating these new Soviet elites. As Stalin explained in October 1920, in order to 
make Soviet power ‘near and dear to the masses of the border regions of Russia,’ it was 
necessary to engage ‘all the best local people’ into Soviet administration, since ‘the masses 
should see that the Soviet power and its organs are the products of their own efforts, the 
embodiment of their aspirations.’56 This process could not be spontaneous, however. Engaging 
indigenous cadres was the key priority of the new Soviet nationalities policy of korenizatsiia 
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introduced at the 1923 party congress. The resolutions of the Twelfth Party Congress of 1923 
obliged regional leaders to engage locals into governmental and party work, use local languages 
in party bureaucracy and paperwork, and encourage the development of national cultures 
through book-publishing, cultural activities and promotion of local languages. Ukrainizatsiia 
became the local variant of korenizatsiia.  
Despite being officially declared, the implementation of korenizatsiia did not start in 
earnest in 1923. This policy met with stubborn passive resistance at all levels. For party 
officials, such declarations did not seem important or obligatory. A number of initiatives, such 
as attending language courses or examinations in language proficiency for government 
employees, were prescribed, but never enforced. As a result, there was a certain level of 
cynicism on the ground, with the lower ranks not taking linguistic korenizatsiia at all seriously. 
The low impact of korenizatsiia was discussed at the 1926 KP(b)U Plenum.57 It was 
decided that more control over the implementation of the policy was necessary, especially in 
those historically Russian-speaking areas, where party members and the working class 
continued to oppose Ukrainizatsiia. The status of korenizatsiia was upgraded in 1926, when 
Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin’s protégé, was appointed the First Secretary of the KP(b)U. 
Kaganovich was selected to implement korenizatsiia using the mechanisms of hard-line 
policies: direct leadership, constant control over the policy’s implementation, use of pressure 
and force as its methods, and restricting disapproving public discussion around this project.58  
In 1926, the implementation of korenizatsiia was reinforced. In a short while, the party 
entrenchment and the indigenisation of the party apparatus achieved remarkable results. 
Ukrainians were given priority during party enrolments. The 1927 party census already attested 
that 69.7% of the party members and 99.5% of candidate-members had joined the party in or 
after 1922.59 Within a couple of years, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the party organs 
grew from 23.6% in 1922 to 47.0% in 1927 and 53.0% in 1930. The number of Ukrainian 
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bureaucrats increased from 35% in 1923 to 50% in 1925 and 54% in 1926 and the number of 
Ukrainians in the government amounted 56.5% in 1926.60 
The increased share of ethnic Ukrainian party members, however, led to growing 
demands for political, economic and cultural autonomy. By the end of the 1920s, an ethnic 
Ukrainian elite, which owed its status and position to the Soviet regime, had been created. As a 
result of the Soviet modernisation campaign, many more people gained access to higher 
education and promotion opportunities, whereas the new Soviet preferential nationalities policy 
created a demand for competence in local languages. The outcomes were, however, twofold. 
On the one hand, the central leadership managed to combat political manifestations of local 
nationalism outside the Bolshevik party, to undermine the position of the former nationalised 
elites and embrace the nationalist sentiment of the local population. On the other hand, as 
Francine Hirsch put it, Soviet ethnic particularism ‘activated national categories, showing that 
nationality, resources, and local political power were officially linked.’61 By the late 1920s, on 
the eve of the great industrialisation drive of 1929 onwards, these new, Soviet, nationalised 
elites in many places – not least Ukraine - were  challenging the central leadership, attempting 
to gain control over the power structure and decision-making. More importantly, regional 
leaders started to question the internationalist [Russian] nature of the industrial proletarian, the 
political base of Bolshevik ideology, and demand a say in the industrialisation campaign. With 
Soviet institutions more firmly implanted across the USSR, and a whole new set of challenges 
facing the leadership in Moscow, the start of the 1930s saw a change of course in nationality 
policy. Although korenizatsiia was never suspended officially, its course was significantly 
redefined by the urgent need to address the growing – and potentially dangerous - influence of 
the nationalised regional Soviet elites, while encouraging a process of rapid industrialisation. 
Unsurprisingly, responses to both of these challenges coincided. The fastest possible industrial 
development was now the party’s top priority, and sensitivity in handling national, or any other, 
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sentiment could be readily sacrificed to this one goal. The Ukrainian famine of 1931-1933 
provided a stark illustration of where these new priorities could lead. . 
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